Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bd0a490bd373bcc1…

MALICIOUS

PDF

82.2 KB Created: 2021-09-18 16:25:02 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-24
MD5: 4fe6b0ccd4326026e3c63e8ae41662e8 SHA-1: 6269b99edc574b815ea2a1807136869dc9eb3b1f SHA-256: bd0a490bd373bcc164ea3babf4372e713426bc7f28bb3c95ce7b715210370eeb
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF contains embedded JavaScript and multiple external links, many pointing to compromised CMS upload directories or disposable hosting. The heuristic 'SE_QR_LURE' suggests the document may instruct users to scan a QR code, a common phishing tactic. The embedded JavaScript and external links likely serve to download and execute a second-stage payload or redirect to a phishing site.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9974

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://chcial.ru/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+use+phone+to+read+qr+code PDF link annotation
    • http://xn--9i1b14lzokxjcrti5um.com/upload/fckeditor/file/kumes.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.costaverde.it/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16138877e22d8a---9792829857.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gesundimjob.at/images/content/files/navogoxaduwuweno.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://3duct.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16141115a44635---sudasowi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rilta.net/userfiles/files/sedudadibidasumeruwoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.babetravelling.com/ckfinder/userfiles2/files/datajepolonitewabuxi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.smwiarus.pl/ckfinder/userfiles/files/23956812250.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://teen.plovdivweek.com/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/namusexewofajisegapup.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://anthonyvienna.com/sites/default/files/file/23293674280.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.recko.ru/ckfinder/userfiles/files/dubiwexanesoguwuw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lycee-elm.info/userfiles/file/63449934013.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.nvsrolko.org/ckfinder/userfiles/files/tobuvitasowowitokixik.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://marathonblainville.com/userfiles/files/vutig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cuborh.com/natelinhanew/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/xujoxasen.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sjar-tech.com/uploadfile/file///2021090917162088.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mya1fc.com/files/ckuploads/files/supitasuzegipi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.capitalroofingct.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16135dc13896de---85470930192.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://konyaalotaksi.com/userfiles/file/sefag.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kbautotech.com/board/datafiles/imagefile/70377426089.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rkenterprisesonline.com/FCKeditor/file/4469917122.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://senesi-sklad.cz/userfiles/file/28667958941.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sfalojistik.com/userfiles/file/wodukewoku.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bratislava.topenglish.sk/app/webroot/gallery/files/56209878698.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jeanthompson.nl/ckfinder/userfiles/files/maninata.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ettorebelfioreliutaio.it/userfiles/files/zojupaburatosezuvigag.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000db16.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDB16 10796 bytes
SHA-256: 0722cc7bd1b09d3eb41be23a7611cfde46f81ed0bc95c410c4e717d700466491
font_01_sfnt_off0000f3b5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF3B5 18296 bytes
SHA-256: 0c2bc790feb13f47c80d5b768bb2ff04f9a3a8c8bb6375da583badfc292c0fe7
font_02_sfnt_off000122df.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x122DF 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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