Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bd091a42459e714c…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.11 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-02-21
MD5: 0c9db2fb3bc302c2815fac8de29c57d8 SHA-1: f37ea095c934e7ff39de985e25282c198469f473 SHA-256: bd091a42459e714ca321b5bbbe2cff6240fbbb6dc2cdc3319cdddc753909adbb
110 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an Excel file containing an embedded Equation Editor OLE object. Static analysis identified a critical vulnerability, CVE-2017-11882, associated with this object, indicating it's designed to exploit this flaw for initial execution. No VBA macros were found to be executable, and the document body is minimal, suggesting the primary malicious function relies on the Equation Editor exploit. The SHA256 hash is included as a primary indicator.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
48643134d138353f6567fa489138a9ab62760beeaf6b8c8b44b6fa48346d87c8
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD0086ACCE/ole10NativE 1776 bytes