Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bd0252bced834160…

MALICIOUS

RTF

2.29 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 2aeba653c69db1813ba1946c582a7d3a SHA-1: ba5f4764d0cffd850ef2a9047c06f72cfaaf5b2f SHA-256: bd0252bced834160fe2ae0e262b5daa92ed78ca90d54e35f532bdafd4ef0cc1c
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: User Execution: Malicious File T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE objects and triggers the CVE-2017-8759 vulnerability. This exploit is known to be used for delivering malware. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics further indicates the malicious nature of the embedded objects. The document body is heavily obfuscated, preventing a clear understanding of its lure, but the exploit itself is sufficient to classify it as malicious.

Heuristics 5

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0023f7e2.bin
c155d326dc2bad3b4c00ed399ff05911368dd0651677f77ed86bf0e0138baa2a
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x23F7E2 1478 bytes