Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bd0092c29d10f6d4…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

226.9 KB
MD5: b76a03e793975bcdf60f13a5bdde3a12 SHA-1: 153c5a1427038567fb4b99f54a34a2a0eeeb5e96 SHA-256: bd0092c29d10f6d46a768015ea3ab30ca9bc5ca13c9a73fd635ed73af966b263
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, including an automatically linked object that is forced to update. This strongly suggests an attempt to exploit OLE object activation to deliver a payload. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic indicates the document likely contains instructions to the user to enable macros or editing, a common social engineering tactic for malware droppers. No scripts were extracted, and no specific family could be identified.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000965.bin
ad2e338820d2f98589c1132be1c56b0304468867178cece7aa38daf5c5d01566
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x965 19460 bytes
objdata_01_off0000a822.bin
18cff8ef194415d33763880bf64011d23305e4b9143b76244b89e1c53b70a0d5
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA822 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off0000bdc5.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBDC5 12297 bytes