Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bce532cb1fc1759b…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.6 KB
MD5: 8710cdf4bdd549570e73749a0071db74 SHA-1: 9c75ad162d2a737b016c862286cfee1579cb149d SHA-256: bce532cb1fc1759b8886ed2e80ab315bd4270032276687ca492e01c5f83809bf
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering critical heuristics related to Equation Editor exploitation. The presence of \objupdate further indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically upon opening, likely leading to the execution of a malicious payload. This points to a classic exploit delivery mechanism targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000af.bin
65496c72d34fe3b4096f01f09ac66b37635c452be7bd90092d2d541503ee2b9b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xAF 1650 bytes