Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bce2d8c4205e3c5a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

98.5 KB Created: 2021-08-16 05:58:27 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: cff87687e272b6cf8f3f23f1010a1fb5 SHA-1: 6db7d911d23403d55c3c44b3d5bcd7baa3881161 SHA-256: bce2d8c4205e3c5a6a7ea7846704a4a1d6b9ca706f1d30bda3cf88d5a44f9c02
284 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains multiple heuristics indicating malicious intent, including a ML classifier flagging it as malicious and a critical ClamAV detection. The document body, though truncated, suggests social engineering tactics like 'ClickFix' and 'Clipboard command execution lure', instructing the user to run commands via Win+R or a terminal. This strongly suggests the PDF is designed to trick users into executing arbitrary commands, likely to download and run a second-stage payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9965

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://pagyesa.org/userfiles/file/20210801095038.pdf
    • https://www.conkite.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d7226521b4d2292bda886bfd446e883c/kugife.pdf
    • http://gld-lining.com/user_img/files/kisufixogodibeg.pdf
    • https://www.actionconstructionjax.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e9de3d2d870bee9954d195f5545345a1/62687822285.pdf
    • http://www.absolutecateringla.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608b95ad2fdf4---19965590213.pdf
    • http://amoy-art.com/Upload/file/zifoniwopotekotezisizapup.pdf
    • http://www.tenniscanberra.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16083ed21c7972---79961666259.pdf
    • http://cungcapbaoduongcuanhatban.com/upload/files/22122514583.pdf
    • http://geobigoni.it/userfiles/files/vexuvemesobi.pdf
    • http://oreade-breche.fr/userfiles/file/62057985882.pdf
    • http://phukhoabacninh.com/images/files/15409610543.pdf
    • https://tch.lu/files/files/pelipelevowi.pdf
    • https://onhimalayas.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/60444862783.pdf
    • https://www.ccps.mx/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/222aa4558e7c5fd3e331057478e3f957/pizafonaper.pdf
    • https://dongytueduc.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/fj8cdq953p8knt3spage5h8l1t/97098569066.pdf
    • http://www.tecnotrefg.it/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609e1c6a14a36---96399205665.pdf
    • http://trenermichal.pl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160acb9b1d890d---sexewasifitolaxubexetidu.pdf
    • https://www.mercato.co.za/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607eec3d52b0d---genusuwugivuxedofakokigo.pdf
    • https://avenirpourtous.fr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607bb61ea3e17---luresoxul.pdf
    • http://stylist.in.ua/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16098636cb9cb0---99183323335.pdf
    • http://mas.vacations/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16073724088da3---gedufezulatarur.pdf
    • http://styropapex.pl/userfiles/file/gajuwinigapopikukor.pdf
    • https://westcoastmovers.ca/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ut9cce6gra5vd4cbg2tderh9i4/baxififedozugina.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/GLLx1DTH0VQ/uplcv?utm_term=cmd+prompt+commands+pdf+download
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00011d91.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11D91 16792 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000135a3.bin
39bc4ddc8ad74776ee16eab49a3c4042f6f790506fb900e0eb0b983556427205		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x135A3 17520 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000163b9.bin
242ffd772a96b1326ed72633db7d1fddb1708230249ef8f9cc0312a2bbfe2e38		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x163B9 10676 bytes

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