Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bce02771b259e3e0…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

20.0 KB
MD5: face9e915f72fc9bd471c78833e10ac8 SHA-1: 3afcfa8e148d76f197b0e42b847270310ed9189e SHA-256: bce02771b259e3e081be3abacf83967fb6e6f217737fae0c25a541c4a868f186
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that contains OLE object data and triggers the RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR heuristic, indicating the use of a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component. The RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristic further suggests that the embedded OLE object is automatically activated. This combination strongly points to an exploit delivery mechanism, likely intended to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000018bd.bin
834ef4271d3f06dd6d02c78d9537ce602ac6103d595737cbfaab54f097df6c9a
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x18BD 1763 bytes