Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bccb60068dbc111c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

103.5 KB Created: 2021-06-27 22:51:20 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 78a4495fb4daaab72698d40bec2c6648 SHA-1: f7439b9504cf122a81914c418e1eeb05fef02d31 SHA-256: bccb60068dbc111c3d1251d8eeba3fcebebabf5f9b6206eaf358fcf1055d4f09
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains numerous links, many pointing to compromised WordPress sites, indicating a link farm designed to obscure the final destination. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely phishing or malware delivery. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and URL patterns are consistent with techniques used to redirect users to malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9926

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.asejnrtigers.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16093b6f9985d7---96891081664.pdf
    • http://www.cargeacrew.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16081e56d5e98e---sisoxabazaroxudejaronowis.pdf
    • http://banghetretruc.com/media/ftp/file/61610738792.pdf
    • https://jnfarley.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/q2kmkrgqktt702fvaugj2d7481/mofavuruvuvatapimifiwuzo.pdf
    • https://boldvision.tv/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c3faff3037d---naravelawejuwomapuvu.pdf
    • http://doublehappyvstheinfinitesadness.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609d2721dd378---bewosi.pdf
    • https://t4g.nasscomfoundation.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f5koj71c9kt23o3btqgq1c7rn7/10083199534.pdf
    • http://stkvn.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f27ac8ca78c6da625735af4340a77fc9/kezim.pdf
    • http://lbhodgereunion.com/clients/3/38/38e1f81cb1ac74d12d86c8ba87866b9f/File/girifopewijogul.pdf
    • https://pluckywize.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16075d5631452b---wiwabawag.pdf
    • https://petroblend.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a11d7802be4---28407668858.pdf
    • https://qualitycountscleaning.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b4d8460b1ecd2b3eb31e2ea634cca90f/63965014539.pdf
    • https://ludifrance.fr/userfiles/file/fepubujozosup.pdf
    • https://higher-reason.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/83938mrj0si2o1idfdhggg1lku/48904599794.pdf
    • http://blog.crowdly.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606f46e09262f---28637275654.pdf
    • https://specialbrands.gr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e188901eaaf785871123415de340bb06/nukizozefomitoma.pdf
    • http://montaze.org/democms/userfiles/file/vubegixudojisi.pdf
    • https://www.hdcorp.com.br/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/stga1mb5ndcq0fjc2m86krh9bk/87001001520.pdf
    • https://www.litesourcenc.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/448d053e78085c881fbe67d45b1f2cec/53933166305.pdf
    • https://www.acptechnologies.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160878fdbd1e35---rivewipamexoludile.pdf
    • https://schmitz.cz/res/file/zururonajisikoxagog.pdf
    • http://www.cuadernos.in/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b9e2260f4d6---51768689866.pdf
    • https://mytekas.com/UserFiles/file/2146532505.pdf
    • http://www.kmclogistics.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/99c7d6ce8e8befdb7c3152e1c311c140/dujutezolafikulixojej.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/GLLx1DTH0VQ/uplcv?utm_term=state+diagram+for+coffee+vending+machine
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00013257.bin
a359e1280cece3a99004faabdbbd71864cf924528b346c238da6334d01ef8240
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13257 17672 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00015ff1.bin
bc0ad58221950d5faecdb4db9b600961023e1cc294fc20df33491332ae1b0cc7
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x15FF1 10848 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0001789c.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1789C 16792 bytes