Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bc98f98ea32dee10…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

740.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-07-25
MD5: d17bce2bc8bd1ecd1fbe990a06b27178 SHA-1: 84afa93ddcb1b76ee75964d295ba7ed9085daedf SHA-256: bc98f98ea32dee104414f7a7602ff7d0a2f013f16427e8095e25803dced23b05
126 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: Malicious File T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-0199 indicates that the sample is designed to exploit this vulnerability, likely to download and execute a remote payload. The embedded URL points to a suspicious DOC file, further supporting this attack vector. The presence of multiple embedded PDFs with suspicious static findings suggests a multi-stage infection process.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://192.3.216.144/INI/INIBINBINBINBINBINBINBINIBINIBINBINBINIBINB%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23INBINBINBINBINBINBINBI.DOC
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001a00.pdf
772425f709525da71d14877efbcbd27ff958dc391d1cddb54a8dcbaf263402a7		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1A00 751616 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006e00.pdf
4af06aab288db1687395382b6762fcf8409a16d503db74990abaaa3e31c8bade		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6E00 730112 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00017000.pdf
0dae05f37cda6c52ad04feea9c5dae7eb10febf4fcdf7b8ed504beceaf6f8e98		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x17000 664064 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00025a00.pdf
8f5c763fd66b473275712fe4967b42c79a8847bb493d495f9a58097f6613f180		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x25A00 604160 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.