Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bc8bd2488b5e5716…

MALICIOUS

RTF

965.4 KB Created: 2019-01-07 23:54:00 First seen: 2020-07-24
MD5: 415de23e9b90f45b71c6dcbdd1c7d777 SHA-1: 54c4dbf5951edcd8ac2dacb634635062cba05125 SHA-256: bc8bd2488b5e5716eaf453e6859dc59639956de161b5c527e6f429140d20103e
122 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains multiple OLE object embeddings, with specific rules indicating the presence of package objects and an \objupdate command designed to force OLE activation. This suggests the file is designed to exploit vulnerabilities within OLE object handling to execute arbitrary code. The embedded object file 'objdata_00_off00000b2c.bin' is the primary artifact of interest.

Heuristics 5

  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Package object class high RTF_OBJCLASS_PACKAGE
    OLE Package object — can wrap arbitrary files
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 15 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000a58.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA58 28219 bytes
SHA-256: 76a6e7067a6dacf5dd54debc1b21701f00df30aa8803ff3920abe0207124014c