Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bc7654cc707307e5…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

224.0 KB Created: 1996-12-17 01:32:42 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: aa161d5ed44e5527c264a10207f01271 SHA-1: 2a7006deaf19412f6246ff05999a0873ffc38252 SHA-256: bc7654cc707307e546d2b09b16ded765cae1eaf1b639051861cc4ec3fdf49b21
360 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

This OLE document contains an embedded PE executable and an embedded SWF file, indicating a multi-stage attack. The document body presents itself as an application form, likely to trick the user into interacting with the embedded malicious content. The presence of WinExec, CreateProcess, ShellExecute, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress API calls suggests the embedded executable is designed to run other processes or load malicious code. The confidence is slightly reduced due to the lack of script content to confirm the exact execution flow.

Heuristics 9

  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • Embedded Adobe Flash (SWF) in OLE document critical OFFICE_EMBEDDED_SWF
    Document contains an embedded Adobe Flash (SWF) object. Vulnerabilities such as CVE-2018-4878 and CVE-2018-15982 involved Flash objects embedded in Office files. Adobe Flash has been end-of-life since December 2020.
  • Reference to WinExec API high SC_STR_WINEXEC
    Reference to WinExec API
  • Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS
    Reference to CreateProcess API
  • Reference to ShellExecute API high SC_STR_SHELLEXEC
    Reference to ShellExecute API
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 229,376 bytes but its declared streams total only 21,308 bytes — 208,068 bytes (91%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.cyberglass.co.uk
    • http://www.hubeiquan.com/happy/heart.htm

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_office_00008868.exe
c2b1c44f50c4883b02f37cc8198fe7dd80a27bed0eec4034391c33fdaff264f1		 embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0x8868 194456 bytes

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