Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bc68340e3ed9a4a0…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

126.5 KB Created: 2008-07-11 06:57:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 64518d438e72e09dcf75c4b978e492a5 SHA-1: 3190d83bfcd4f084457b18cd10d060f3dfdcb809 SHA-256: bc68340e3ed9a4a030789d98cc7869f05af9420e31f2ec383f8ebdc25618b97e
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The OLE document exhibits a large slack region and appended executable-looking payload bytes, indicating it functions as a dropper. VBA macros could not be extracted due to an unsupported format, but the presence of appended executable data is a strong indicator of malicious intent. The SHA256 hash of the file is provided as a primary IOC.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 129,536 bytes but its declared streams total only 16,543 bytes — 112,993 bytes (87%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • OLE file has appended executable-looking payload bytes high OLE_APPENDED_PAYLOAD
    OLE compound file contains a large high-entropy region beyond the declared major streams and that region includes shellcode, PE, or loader API markers. This is a payload-carrier signal, not a specific CVE attribution by itself.
  • Unsupported Office format for VBA extraction info OFFICE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED
    olevba could not extract VBA macros (PermissionError); format-agnostic byte-level scans still ran. Likely legacy, encrypted, or malformed OLE/OOXML — re-scanning the same bytes will yield the same outcome.

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