Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bc67f10f5110fee9…

MALICIOUS

PDF

72.9 KB Created: 2021-06-06 20:39:00 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-11-25
MD5: 6442aabee6f90481a14f3a9e259abf06 SHA-1: 44feb24141527a1419f226de3bbdc20962cde851 SHA-256: bc67f10f5110fee9c272641fe9eb8fe14f5975a7394f8c67a483d84268671a0d
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF file contains a large number of external links, many pointing to disposable hosting services like Weebly, indicating a link farm or SEO spamming operation. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely related to phishing or distributing further malware. The embedded URL and the nature of the link farm suggest an attempt to lure users to malicious sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9956

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://crewmak.ru/pbw?utm_term=java+projects+with+source+code+free+download+for+mca+students PDF link annotation
    • https://duwesokele.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606866/gutimefi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4416940/normal_60614e19efd4b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sukifife.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134334287/pulew.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4379035/normal_6011e621e2aab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zasigusedorel.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134386673/f1e98f6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4488574/normal_6026a4de047b2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fedubipogumuwu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379546/zudixapumu-miviv-jefekamepavig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4415770/normal_602170b3a6a3a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gomarevijupa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134585171/dogufazebag.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://radoxawema.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738714/namatonarixujilozo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zuwadakake.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134664894/a48f4f162af1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4420459/normal_6046a7c8f1aea.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4392649/normal_6068c006dedf1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4481699/normal_5ff169dc818ac.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://supuzuvafexag.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135383103/radaxodajivevuwo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static-d.com/uploads/4470703/normal_60b6dc5f0b5c6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4368782/normal_5fdc77bc1db44.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c6d6b898-09f6-4780-9d12-5e98153c50cf/is_it_hard_to_learn_how_to_be_a_cashier.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/54b6be2d-0204-40f8-a983-fd8807e5efdf/13303279260.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ddc0c128-1919-447d-98ed-2cc7347bf681/photography_studio_booking_software.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/38ad3577-9ccf-4106-9f9f-7bd349448517/towimabatowiripo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/81f30939-b78a-4e37-9b06-666106671bb0/fakevu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/66c422bf-534e-465c-bc41-c863bd397f5a/how_to_factory_reset_alesis_dm10.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/614b77d2-8b4c-46a2-84cb-bf29366cfa43/everstart_jump_starter_1200_instructions.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c70c0489-213f-4aae-839d-5fd10fb3a50e/zaladejotogeteditudojike.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/5e6e9a77-cad2-4703-b56b-ee8997b65d95/68071509543.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000dd4e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDD4E 5612 bytes
SHA-256: ec8eff116e7dc6433e4afbc909a6c20cd1bb41e0bc29ff334f54075aa17e832d
font_01_sfnt_off0000f054.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF054 10744 bytes
SHA-256: f717f5a01fbfdaf27c1e3b389f87ad677ac0adf2103359dd0b84400717c80310

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