Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bc56800c2f68b752…

MALICIOUS

PDF

64.4 KB Created: 2021-02-23 23:10:42 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-04-25
MD5: 16c103b6463388d40729c6d8b670cc75 SHA-1: 6d9a8dee457023b8ac4526039ff6409be7a9cb83 SHA-256: bc56800c2f68b7528b2a6330204b71d7daa6beeed4f78e4c2279d0902ba96b1d
244 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://yafferge.ru/wix?keyword=michelob+ultra+koozie+custom In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4422884/normal_5fdab7c8370d1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4402944/normal_5fd68eed5bf6c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4471723/normal_60193314344df.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4365582/normal_5ffef18f753ea.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4367921/normal_5fedc11d9d89b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369173/normal_601010b3cb6e2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bigififipajug.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134709095/susalevuzapupe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/dodamewope/jidicjd/liveauctioneers_bid_auctions.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sis-paypal.com/duragemoxavebar38s77.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://remastacer.com/83671994916uzza7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tekchambre.xyz/nulidojofotobutujwkno.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4420459/normal_5fd256339337a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kavavori.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134012315/kodebegitupizukeno.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tasuvuka.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/1/134108605/ruduwomoxejudu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/wogebebaruro/bKid2Nl/best_one_volume_history_of_world_war_i.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ziwarojuwetupo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134343479/8900635.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4412768/normal_5fe9fd3aca703.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000c0f7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC0F7 5300 bytes
SHA-256: 114991568b5cd04fcb9374bfb801198ca08f2f88a98a87d630aeae725e09eb8b
font_01_sfnt_off0000d2e3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD2E3 9880 bytes
SHA-256: da2a2b6c640bc9e0923b789bc0e77c95926909ec87fb30ad13c9d65603920dd3

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