Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bc2f53230de7b4bd…

MALICIOUS

PDF

89.1 KB Created: 2021-06-26 18:42:30 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 66856fad8ef36bebf44d5b4e5c6c2659 SHA-1: 28c5c36d6acb8b6a448f93e826c15a5c8a1cfc03 SHA-256: bc2f53230de7b4bd758d5ee90922452f04fb75454ff83d4b09c50a413413b559
216 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF file contains numerous links to external websites, many of which are hosted on compromised CMS platforms or disposable domains. The heuristic firings indicate a link farm designed to distribute malicious content or phish users. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the nature of the URLs and the ClamAV detection suggest it is a malicious phishing or trojan delivery mechanism.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9942

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://meadescafe.com/userfiles/file/1746594576.pdf
    • http://www.sunarnuricomuisvealisverismerkezi.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7tidc2j3g183pq50qmkou4hdf4/wenatekoledikita.pdf
    • http://aelma.com/sites/default/userfiles/file/41112433653.pdf
    • http://79.170.40.182/boothtastic.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607526463162d---xuwitejovapowumawixowaga.pdf
    • https://implant-drill.com/userfiles/file/fasejikenozuginefiziz.pdf
    • http://franklinbristerharveyfamily.com/clients/a/a8/a8910385c57dfddac3c6311e2bd1422e/File/75116087160.pdf
    • https://daismene.it/file/xalam.pdf
    • http://a2itsolutions.com/chop/multimedia/userfiles/file/99760410250.pdf
    • http://www.tobywells.org/media/fckdir/file/wufegafowuxavuv.pdf
    • http://afghansolar.com/userfiles/file/vafamedefazamotedikemuzi.pdf
    • https://www.advids.io/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b082f0315ba---23950289952.pdf
    • http://diagonal.org.ar/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a86bb8a2f3c---55785198114.pdf
    • http://www.fsnn.se/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c8f7796ecbb---gosijojuwapedogatejip.pdf
    • http://alliusie.com/userfiles/file/9281848132.pdf
    • http://jamoncup.es/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608e52931a2a3---vidaxiradugok.pdf
    • https://getlovebooks.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/fe4e2dddbba7e7a95dcbc9965b4ebe25/1041684798.pdf
    • http://cloverpark1959.com/clients/51168/File/bokusufesetaxuduxema.pdf
    • https://doellefjelde-mussemarked.dk/images/newsmail/file/39511873406.pdf
    • https://yarsan.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5707499272f96702ef15383614e3a314/midenu.pdf
    • https://marciasmithconsulting.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ae101824da1f4b16e07b7c18ea06254c/16265423182.pdf
    • https://www.toptalentusa.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c8fc10a47ea---wukuvulunebopedudum.pdf
    • http://robwalker.net/fckupload/file/lefitesisavivelega.pdf
    • http://aeskulap24h.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bf8a3ba92ac---44474087146.pdf
    • http://28777886.com/Lpf/UPFILE/userfiles/files/pagirofesemutagexiv.pdf
    • http://dbjhockeytournament.com/clients/f/f9/f9ff496842c877cbb4522510b668f2a2/File/xebixomugafasub.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/LPIa9PGmDLg/uplcv?utm_term=to+earn+profit
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000fb18.bin
eb579b123e2bb2ab072c39d3800c155ec34022593037f946cc11da9d3702ec69
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFB18 17340 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00012887.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12887 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0001409e.bin
90c6afa2787e4b8caa420796a9ec1996af1940519cf2643a33b44c381f4ffaf7
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1409E 10100 bytes