Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bc19f7738b361573…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

375.9 KB
MD5: 993cd2b2ba622b95c2e4601b1f7c8035 SHA-1: 016fca1e57634a39de7e4e0c96b82b48609a4f77 SHA-256: bc19f7738b3615730088eb93ad5ca5a9dbe09ed607f42657f5499eb60ca97134
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, including automatically linked and updated objects, which are commonly used to deliver malicious payloads. The presence of an "Enable Editing" lure in the document body strongly suggests a social engineering attempt to bypass security measures. No specific scripts were extracted, but the OLE object structure indicates a likely downloader or dropper functionality.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000bac.bin
1faf4851715743b0f11be35680d469a63226ec8ac4a64a59e42e3a69bd4feafa
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBAC 79780 bytes
objdata_01_off0000735b.bin
a444baacf8f108b21825b70aaf6855351b6f68af8e8c36443cce1a7fc976b137
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x735B 79753 bytes
objdata_02_off0002fbfa.bin
a8e170497da15decc11753d202c99c86f7a7ffd2d52481e6b9c79a5403675379
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2FBFA 2632 bytes
objdata_03_off0003119d.bin
e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3119D 12297 bytes