Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bc169de271db5698…

MALICIOUS

PDF

35.2 KB
MD5: 4c35877078387bc18ecd72059df950d7 SHA-1: 112939b83271eb7319ed290067a76fcdab187147 SHA-256: bc169de271db56982af5e08404d0dd556d99553a99f3a63eca23094d2c78f36c
102 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The PDF file exhibits multiple indicators of malicious intent, including embedded JavaScript and RichMedia (Flash) content. The presence of `String.fromCharCode` and ASCIIHexDecode filters suggests obfuscation techniques commonly used to hide malicious code. The embedded JavaScript stream and the RichMedia object are likely responsible for executing the malicious payload, potentially leading to further exploitation or download of additional malware. The extracted URLs, while not definitively malicious, are associated with the document's structure and could be part of the attack chain.

Heuristics 9

  • RichMedia (Flash) high PDF_RICHMEDIA
    PDF contains /RichMedia (Adobe Flash) which is a historic exploit vector
  • ASCIIHexDecode filter (with exploit indicators) medium PDF_FILTER_HEX
    Hex-encoding filter present alongside exploit delivery indicators — often used to hide payload or shellcode bytes
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • String.fromCharCode low PDF_FROMCHARCODE
    String.fromCharCode found — used to construct payload strings dynamically. Common in benign JavaScript libraries for codepoint manipulation, so this alone is informational; weaponised use is also caught by the dedicated fromCharCode-stage and exploit-shape rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/2.6/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.6/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0016.bin
8f9c84c8c00bc62ae296a81fac6640aa852ea67548abc1bd639aa0da1a1696c4
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 16 at offset 0xE33 27347 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.99, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
javascript_obj0006_000.js
29f7993e5cd56a21fb47e9126971a6bd29d78f908444804f16bfb88e5772a86f
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 6 at offset 0x105 10464 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).