Malicious Office (OOXML) / .XLSM — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bbe3b9175095f094…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .XLSM

29.4 KB Created: 2022-08-03 10:47:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 16.0300 First seen: 2022-08-03
MD5: cbab091d7de15b7cb157c9fb721f1813 SHA-1: 67b454d3dbc08dff88fd8d905bcb09f752ac2290 SHA-256: bbe3b9175095f0942fbcc4d2ebfef68b972ccf9f22cf52012a3e31eb498b4091
168 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The critical heuristic 'OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC' indicates that the VBA macros are designed to download a file from an HTTP URL and save it to disk. The script uses 'CreateObject("MSXML2.XMLHTTP")' to fetch the content and 'CreateObject("ADODB.Stream")' to save it, likely to execute a second-stage payload. The obfuscated URLs suggest a downloader functionality.

Heuristics 5

  • VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC
    VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
8be9aec09a72a25ab0d1df19f5dece45db34f159454eca61d89c7c02975423ed
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 2845 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
acc1361d28f315dc8654b763bf36349cc48eb88c695c42c0747fe36c635e4e25
vba-project OOXML VBA project: xl/vbaProject.bin 21504 bytes