Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bbe06e0ef40d63c4…

MALICIOUS

PDF

92.5 KB Created: 2021-07-09 12:43:58 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 8072a676c96597ed40bda84df31e0a65 SHA-1: ca988e59eeb6645bc0d522eb9766c16d44d50567 SHA-256: bbe06e0ef40d63c4c46e1b3d81ef1ba714c45e73b6335ea29c03157cfa826140
164 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains a large number of embedded URLs, many of which point to compromised CMS upload directories, suggesting a link farm designed to redirect users to malicious content. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely phishing or malware distribution. No scripts were extracted, but the structure and URL findings are sufficient to infer a malicious workflow.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9942

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://storage-in-motion.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16075c796d6a23---71163504971.pdf
    • https://laetitiabernard.fr/images/file/34116836166.pdf
    • https://ethiquedevelopers.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ba8d95ad4bd1f426b7a3d8bd7b630269/35608329166.pdf
    • https://yziact.fr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ddqnr06qbd9tqu8t3io1sc7ua5/17378265319.pdf
    • http://truthtube.com/UserFiles/file/xineralebuda.pdf
    • https://bikinibody.be/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0r57uh3gpotvjfd2g708dbkjis/95970056914.pdf
    • http://www.investing-in-women.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608508266e7f7---12064559755.pdf
    • http://www.anjhimayath.com/upload/file/93692169462.pdf
    • http://mawaevents.com/uploads/file/gepisuduredosul.pdf
    • https://www.birdandwildlifeteam.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608fbd5a3b423---mototepuvokaf.pdf
    • http://mineraux-et-lithotherapie.fr/ckeditor/upload/files/94378202334.pdf
    • https://regalcabs.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a8cdc1da417---pibewew.pdf
    • http://kystop.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0nnrji5n7cbh22mdrjf1c0sa10/zanedavawenuwogul.pdf
    • https://popa.com.br/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/67fe9858274254a26022640fa0e0f20a/27438934162.pdf
    • https://forcechicago.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/33fdb9b497f1cdcf49ccc95f54cd1355/667498529.pdf
    • http://bagandpack.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/55865d82a297c478ca2638a6ed71e845/6604025578.pdf
    • https://biblioteka-koneck.pl/ckfinder/userfiles/files/24635699751.pdf
    • https://acethamessecurity.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5c520528569445347a253225f990b9ec/73910157499.pdf
    • https://completecollegestrategies.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/6ff55717b0f8d0793bfcd6bb80f884cd/69993013651.pdf
    • http://hellnocancershow.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16097d250e1bdc---jabodib.pdf
    • https://www.waterlooarmsnewforest.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0ee08bf9ebfc63af4b42560433ecb907/66948942502.pdf
    • http://xn--80age2amlc.xn--80adxhks/pics/images/file/39181030642.pdf
    • http://www.consorcio.edu.pe/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16070f61076b4e---67906775041.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/LPIa9PGmDLg/uplcv?utm_term=boating+exam+answers+ontario
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00010397.bin
021480c84036e0ace2db60856f65336dda2cd44e7d44741091da1ac61823c2ca
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10397 10644 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00011c16.bin
62e08d5801244fd9fff15b7d9badd56344d4f4a06a55a5a105f7240f651e0d1e
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11C16 18592 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00014cb8.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x14CB8 16792 bytes