Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bbdcee63c3c384fd…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.28 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 66cb66c342de6854f337afd18ad6de90 SHA-1: c78ae3b31395ee987356d32f946b7b992f9b735d SHA-256: bbdcee63c3c384fd1be2a1c13f3b1ea275b16b02a98f6f7c5ee7bc8847f0db7e
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The file is an RTF document containing embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering the critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and CVE_2017_8759 heuristics. This indicates the document is designed to exploit CVE-2017-8759, likely by leveraging the Equation Editor to execute malicious code. The presence of an embedded URL, though benign, suggests a delivery mechanism for further malicious activity.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00134e62.bin
1f02170e651d58770307206a7de6414dcf494910b6e2a7b0ce5e9d8ae9f5cae0
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x134E62 3732 bytes