Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bbda313106bf97da…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

110.1 KB
MD5: 0c181a4d5ea7638e1f67ea76113a1ea5 SHA-1: 511a0e8c1ecb0f996c22f030e31230f641bfff28 SHA-256: bbda313106bf97da4c49c5a4cc1aaff19f2af37791582e6b6ae1f09f9c52d3b4
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment

The presence of the SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS heuristic indicates that the sample attempts to launch an external process. This is further supported by the SC_XOR_ENCODED heuristic, suggesting obfuscated code likely responsible for process creation. The OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY suggests potential padding or hidden data within the OLE structure. While no specific malicious URLs were extracted, the combination of these heuristics points to a macro-based execution attempt, common in phishing scenarios.

Heuristics 4

  • XOR-encoded strings (key 0x98) critical SC_XOR_ENCODED
    Found 8 Windows library/API name(s) XOR-encoded with single-byte key 0x98: 'wininet.dll', 'LoadLibraryA', 'GetProcAddress', 'CreateProcessA', 'CreateFileA', 'InternetOpenA', 'HttpOpenRequestA', 'HttpSendRequestA'
  • Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS
    Reference to CreateProcess API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 112,765 bytes but its declared streams total only 56,346 bytes — 56,419 bytes (50%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.microsoft.com
    • https://www.verisign.com/rpa
    • http://ocsp.verisign.com/ocsp/status0
    • https://www.verisign.com/rpa0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CodeSignPCA.crl0

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