Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bbd927d4389313c1…

MALICIOUS

PDF

38.3 KB Created: 2020-10-03 01:55:29 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-10
MD5: a1d4cd44926e61246f31e112f25ed4d6 SHA-1: 78a30a24126c7ad57371277fb2f85ffbb957029d SHA-256: bbd927d4389313c11b7ce7e492f5c9b72e5db42cd4d0069820725b75aeb3512b
224 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/strik?keyword=%25C3%25BC%25C3%25A7gensel+say%25C4%25B1+dizisi In PDF document text
    • http://files.magistrasolomon.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739443/buropamamujopa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.daviswaterconditioning.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856232/ada7425f6254.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nirinut.shadesbyshanni.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131636644/3736606.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bunuper.mjoftrades.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398455/2276658.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mulamepum.invictund.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131397987/6d8d76f2c1fb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1038999.mozfiles.com/files/1038999/besojuzuxumagafuzesapelav.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037145.mozfiles.com/files/1037145/semumixeribi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036659.mozfiles.com/files/1036659/27893514144.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lasopix.charlestoncounselingportal.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857782/rufuzadufegerukipe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lezidore.angelacarlsen.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695535/kozemidexowidavibore.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.danielwalcherrealestateservices.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381677/4849800.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/dd42b16d-4b2f-4f52-8e97-2d54e7e85b7e/23321710686.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/fe65b35d-870c-4bcd-8df2-51c0da7dea61/51879990583.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c6505571-028f-48a2-83e6-028b6bb65792/zujewegalezovefapekilubez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005149.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5149 5276 bytes
SHA-256: 9cefc1d71da71f6a738a207a0262d86ec01513044dcd0b5a1bbd1a5b5f504727
font_01_sfnt_off0000636a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x636A 12792 bytes
SHA-256: ce1e6a613d7ba703f3823951043a266016796899a35756d83c11489da47f3189