PDF malware analysis — malicious · bbbbdad563041fdc

MALICIOUS

PDF

42.7 KB Created: 2020-07-28 23:06:33 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)

MD5: cbe200595efdfa4e3546d49400d6b688 SHA-1: b13bbd5dccc91d322578be1761149414138c6993 SHA-256: bbbbdad563041fdcd532984e1dd09ae15ae13e24bf3d47d33c1eac90485dd7ce

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell

The PDF contains a lure suggesting the user needs to format an SD card, which is a common social engineering tactic. It embeds multiple external links, with one pointing to a known malicious redirector. The heuristic 'PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK' confirms this, and 'PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM' indicates a large number of external links, likely for SEO manipulation or distributing payloads. The heuristic 'SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE' suggests the document may also instruct the user to execute commands, further indicating malicious intent.

Heuristics 4

PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK

PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM

Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE

Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=cannot+format+sd+card+macbook+pro
- http://files.silkysbrooklyn.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856158/1608646.pdf
- http://files.advanceadvocacyandsupport.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131163617/wakijedovenifal-muwajolanis-sixafa-jononilu.pdf
- http://files.ourconsciousconnection.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131483053/4096026.pdf
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/0316/6369/files/tubizekot.pdf
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/1097/2053/files/vebud.pdf
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/0070/9791/files/62211265379.pdf
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/7512/5923/files/37339560976.pdf
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/5032/7451/files/82475545970.pdf
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/0165/1105/files/bowitufifeletudesidezedew.pdf
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/9992/1315/files/rakebulawuzesufek.pdf
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/1918/1978/files/wapadopijenos.pdf
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/9095/8749/files/linujunudafuzumed.pdf
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/4796/0232/files/xanefofiman.pdf
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/5032/7451

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`font_00_sfnt_off00006b19.bin` `f4ce2ffa59879926fc9bffe45ff2995c151f58ec2c1551c92a2a08f8b54c32ef`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6B19	5120 bytes
`font_01_sfnt_off00007c5d.bin` `ab79c347fd4154f6c6d76d01638f71635326231bbd1ff28f3b0962a187d16144`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7C5D	9832 bytes

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