Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bba6597fbce040c7…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

31.8 KB
MD5: 4551f0aadfaad63b56512ac877c66548 SHA-1: 30090e74443630414d0875cbef3f003ee0ee9b56 SHA-256: bba6597fbce040c73ef29eeba2a6714f0b29676f8bccb55e94fe4eef1d7deed8
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

The sample contains multiple high-severity heuristics indicating the use of CVE-2017-11882 or CVE-2018-0802 via an embedded Equation.3 OLE object. The use of \objupdate to force automatic activation of the object upon opening is a strong indicator of an exploit document. No scripts were extracted from this sample, so the second-stage payload's intent cannot be determined.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000016a0.bin
8bb8401243b01d8ac938e901b8bbfe033746c3297b9ef18162961b6df16c1e0a
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x16A0 1788 bytes