<Equation.Editor.Exploiter> — RTF / .DOC malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bba61d5e17515875…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.7 KB
MD5: fff312347c03021523c229c21d4367c6 SHA-1: 55c77fcc8e9b37bc01ad96d070d6f8424f985f41 SHA-256: bba61d5e175158757aca8e919d25c311cecdd54599aa7955577926033d753101
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

<Equation.Editor.Exploiter> · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Data Encrypted T1204 User Execution

The presence of multiple high-severity heuristics related to RTF embedding techniques strongly suggests exploitation against known MS Equation Editor CVEs; specifically, offsets indicate split-byte obfuscated triggers alongside auto-linking/updating mechanisms typical only to these attacks.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000d3.bin
a85129b1cac5cdf5dd1a13bcb9d80282e13a4c5af926183a1e752c7314856526
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD3 2150 bytes