Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bb8f47f2560ec1b9…

MALICIOUS

RTF

19.7 KB
MD5: b64b78072834633c491b03082ce3e794 SHA-1: 92edbf28582563d57353712368f2c335e9de2758 SHA-256: bb8f47f2560ec1b99eb3f19e2848dfb7dbd5b5a285c40fb2664e75ec38df1439
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains embedded OLE object data, specifically triggering the Equation Editor. Heuristics indicate a high likelihood of exploitation for CVE-2017-11882, a known vulnerability that allows for arbitrary code execution. This suggests the file is designed to deliver a malicious payload via this exploit.

Heuristics 5

  • Obfuscated Equation Editor ProgID + activation critical CVE related RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID from top-level \objdata hex after nested RTF junk groups are ignored, and the document also contains \objemb plus \objupdate activation. This is an obfuscated Equation Editor exploit surface associated with CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 families, but no exact malformed MTEF CVE primitive was recovered from this object.
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001140.bin
a02bbdf81131ee10d78fdbd02743881238945f3abea4f12cad83e7cfb05f9bc2
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1140 2081 bytes