Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bb84d4b99efcacdf…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

275.0 KB Created: 2021-03-21 16:41:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: 1c09e2ff0080fe5851d7a5d76037e6ac SHA-1: 87d949bc5a06cd3fb3b25f5a0e6ad54183ebaa40 SHA-256: bb84d4b99efcacdf946e8a7b6ee776a1b3f5b82a06cc5f1eabad8978cb31f0dc
69 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking: Component Object Model Hijacking

The file is a Microsoft Office document containing an embedded OLE object. Heuristics indicate that this OLE object is a package carrying an executable or script file, specifically identified as a '.jar' file. This suggests the document is a delivery mechanism for a malicious payload, likely an executable or script, embedded within the OLE object.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
19366c6c1e182c21b268bf32d7efc32f9107f8e14ee90f7caecb6a9e60eb6943		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 271872 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.98, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
7405c1d1beb1b8e9ed71e9f6b7164b2d762736c094ff023b92769578bacb4fce		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 267161 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
b90e6b59a58231bec788bff1636837664736ddfe0cace356af0a92620d22cd04		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5148 bytes

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