Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bb74768486cb43dd…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

446.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2026-06-10
MD5: 5cf75a043ff92ec025a87ff1692d2237 SHA-1: ca95500f3be0dd8d170772830a19bfac481e93e7 SHA-256: bb74768486cb43ddd4d4b33c8c9b5c4a0b6dbebe9d7cd9e66d24a6c0a88e4485
226 Risk Score

Heuristics 7

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Equation Editor shellcode downloads a second-stage payload critical OLE_MTEF_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    The shellcode reached by the Equation Editor overflow resolves download/exec APIs and fetches a second-stage payload. The URL was recovered by emulating the shellcode's self-decoding stub; an integer-encoded host (e.g. http://000030000706151) is normalised to its dotted-quad form and both spellings are surfaced.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements info OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://107.173.143.37/httpswww.hipaavault.comresourceshipaa-compliant-cloud-storage-secure-your-healthcare-data.php In document text (OLE body)
    • http://015353307445/httpswww.hipaavault.comresourceshipaa-compliant-cloud-storage-secure-your-healthcare-data.phpIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://000030000706151In document text (OLE body)
    • http://192.3.140.105Decoded from obfuscated IP host (000030000706151)

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
SHA-256: 7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisWorkbook"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020819-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet2"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet3"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
ole10native_00.bin ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD006C0F75/OLE10natiVE 1865 bytes
SHA-256: 4dce83ff0913759d315a8f8623910fe26f1626e5e32ecb64c1b262fcd378bdaa
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001000.pdf polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1000 453120 bytes
SHA-256: 4aa972311c9534eb34b808514dd181df9685b46491b63b3d6fa61e786f62e789
polyglot_child_pdf_off00018200.pdf polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x18200 358400 bytes
SHA-256: 455a1d903b6a6cec757b9593665baf1e3de0e384b693d858d19c3a4b45f28ede
polyglot_child_pdf_off00022e00.pdf polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x22E00 314368 bytes
SHA-256: 01cfeb070f0670b7dc1cb315a97d9833cbb4146c42877f83d3c62bf3920f7bb3
polyglot_child_pdf_off00039e00.pdf polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x39E00 220160 bytes
SHA-256: f7503347059cbfa0c55e926c672541fd09c793b0593326900a92e37e3467e709

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