RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · bb5a9fba4ce05de5

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

226.9 KB

MD5: f78f66f9deff0cdf80e47c0a8d1ad2fc SHA-1: 94f5867ae879f17fab1f605d7b1d2166248a75e7 SHA-256: bb5a9fba4ce05de5d8bb2faa9c2bf65e14c46a447f87ea782101e06f9bd79336

180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple embedded OLE objects, with one being automatically linked and another triggering an update, indicating an attempt to activate embedded content. The presence of a 'Macro/content-enable lure' heuristic further suggests the document is designed to trick the user into enabling malicious content. While no specific scripts were extracted, the OLE object activation and lure point towards a downloader or dropper functionality.

Heuristics 6

Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED

RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000965.bin` `3842fc1eaf2a53c2ea7e379ed41c4a9b8facf41e8bbf9248662fbf94469287ec`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x965	19472 bytes
`objdata_01_off0000a83c.bin` `18cff8ef194415d33763880bf64011d23305e4b9143b76244b89e1c53b70a0d5`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xA83C	2632 bytes
`objdata_02_off0000bddf.bin` `44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xBDDF	12297 bytes

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