Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bb35fff12760a848…

MALICIOUS

PDF

71.6 KB Created: 2021-02-13 17:52:16 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: 2cefb97a018f09ba057faa1151fb8489 SHA-1: d66f310e2a198a023aa0e62a37b3df709700acad SHA-256: bb35fff12760a8481a619a54113745e96a1be1fae70a8b28bed397fe3ea70621
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file was flagged by multiple heuristics as malicious, including a critical alert for linking to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The document body, though truncated, contains metadata suggesting it was generated by wkhtmltopdf, and the numerous embedded URLs point to disposable hosting and potentially malicious domains. The primary attack pattern appears to be phishing or redirection to malicious sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://crophysi.ru/123?utm_term=100+yr+calendar In PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/tumowara/ggKnhhM/wefemekexirajekalod.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zuzivosojix.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775151/togevow_sogevomudov.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vipavogezeguw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131069860/5175547.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bilet-pdd.site/pompeii_ruins_map1fr4f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bebaguromiva.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813696/mukije_tawupulidisopu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rubosesizip.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134744628/xufubopexibe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hotel-engels.ru/star_trek_timelines_event_guideekiwk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gradstroy.su/shin_chan_episodes_in_tamil_free02mn3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/mogizilo/gejdRxH/56128660329.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vodadavubex/KyihicA/42077156336.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://shop-kid-toys.online/brihaspati_vrat_udyapan_vidhi_in_hindi0fevz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/nafumozuwe/VhioiaP/robanidowozudomudedogogep.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://peketodofow.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134589962/32451c61.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wupupetobuzune.22web.org/facade_design_pattern_example_in_android.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/segevenujuka/2hjwvii/iphone_ringtone_remix_lyrics.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d03b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD03B 4508 bytes
SHA-256: 253ca026fd6f1e8d755cdaa757e8db98fa6f89d82c56bc4a0e15c8ef40ee0c20
font_01_sfnt_off0000df83.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDF83 10504 bytes
SHA-256: 070014eb9c447717a1768a56968bb136d794eba036da5d76ea8dcd6191689f3a
font_02_sfnt_off0001037c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1037C 4324 bytes
SHA-256: a542ec26cea93e049a2e27cd59b1347dd9bbdea13775fd7b822b3c2b3136116f