Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bb31ceaf902b2594…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.9 KB Created: 2020-08-31 04:22:03 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: befcdb0b2d3eb3d7e328b277a3b5821e SHA-1: e68bed059475dd33f37ad8a78a6502d335f30e7e SHA-256: bb31ceaf902b2594fbc4bd87b2e8ac0a286bab50b0f74538ea7a7b4d96e6fb90
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains embedded links, one of which, https://ttraff.com/wix?keyword=winrar+64+bit+win+10, is identified as a malicious redirector. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, appears to contain text related to software downloads and passwords, aligning with the 'SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE' heuristic. This suggests the PDF is designed to trick users into downloading a password-protected archive, likely containing malware, by directing them through the malicious redirector.

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/wix?keyword=winrar+64+bit+win+10
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/136d07_3ab84553731245c7b7ec9063b087db40.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_070ce2bf6836403db4bed0a752beced0.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_1e0f500d713148e38461148786b0980f.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b13fd1_b3d855328a204147a3f3d8be42ae4b22.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/3885/7623/files/44951922865.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/4444/5092/files/mopuvotolavirilurati.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0440/1581/2766/files/70711662848.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/8782/1984/files/vutob.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/1870/5306/files/bearing_selection_calculation.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/0510/0707/files/tomosu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/3913/7697/files/oracle_provider_for_ole_db.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/963627_5d1b9d158c70425f9068d9ad49ccc3d7.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/67e251_415aaca4f996452ba7c344e2f3a633a7.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_550e1608d7534594aaa9e56f712f9d10.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_f007bc98e8bb44aaa869ac30fb6a8071.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007141.bin
d7b0351a4426a953049c053994ee2d554dd8a46c974afdfc21096dec9787793c
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7141 5152 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000082f0.bin
f71dfbc2e9e2534d66b3318a09c8b90dd6722bc7cc91bb52ccbe705f55858302
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x82F0 10780 bytes