Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCM — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bb301ca8c6b45675…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCM

141.9 KB Created: 2020-06-02 08:00:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 792eb51f509b3fb8dbae3f5b61f2ba74 SHA-1: 26980a27ff59962256a34516bcacd5758d876208 SHA-256: bb301ca8c6b4567553fd8d0b7ddb4425109f5cb865bc209569a156260f72f6c7
260 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The sample is a DOCM file containing a Document_Open macro, which is a common technique for initiating malicious activity upon opening the document. The macro utilizes WScript.Shell and CreateObject calls, indicating it attempts to execute commands or scripts. This behavior strongly suggests the document is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload, typical of macro-based malware delivery.

Heuristics 7

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7518bf0cd8b078c115c347cceb6345c63a53d8e687213aed86ccd109fe287806		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 3274 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
646a9fac88b567e5fc7b2275b3ce3b294f88feb6909a9f10f011e3f47bce5785		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 11264 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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