Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bb2a7eec8f57d21b…

MALICIOUS

RTF

4.1 KB
MD5: e6ec2662d808a98a2377aa3eb7eb30d0 SHA-1: 47e645d31e95e368a39509d8d4b37a659f29092a SHA-256: bb2a7eec8f57d21bd68851de682904b71125bef3bd69f51dea2fd65400b8ceec
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers heuristics related to the Equation Editor vulnerability. This indicates an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability for client-side code execution. The presence of ".objupdate" further suggests that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically, likely leading to the execution of a malicious payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000ac.bin
63a6a7a6c4e4a7be02e737bccc9064546c8feb8a12dffe169700ff2e05e0ff28		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xAC 1784 bytes

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