Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bb20e491bb56fade…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

227.6 KB
MD5: 3b11dad45f6741b56d5fe852ad47930e SHA-1: f46ab7e699d9ec90a6ba0890e1ed0cf98c44aac8 SHA-256: bb20e491bb56fade80049efca65bc4280b934087cd813f5896e2dbe26b83444f
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, including automatically linked and updated objects, which are designed to activate upon opening. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic indicates the document instructs the user to enable macros or editing, a common social engineering tactic. This suggests the document's primary purpose is to bypass security measures and execute embedded malicious content.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000965.bin
9ab7af3d60e2b7391d3601425d8d30b83ffc9b24f3f97ff3ba5cdd5c3527fa5d
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x965 19828 bytes
objdata_01_off0000ab20.bin
18cff8ef194415d33763880bf64011d23305e4b9143b76244b89e1c53b70a0d5
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xAB20 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off0000c0c3.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC0C3 12297 bytes