Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bb1677c6aeca1ccd…

MALICIOUS

PDF

75.4 KB Created: 2020-11-04 20:48:56 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-27
MD5: be36ceea80a0e5a0525db30710fa7921 SHA-1: 7634ac52e31d72b994156a6b427580cd74cd167a SHA-256: bb1677c6aeca1ccdde1d1461d385b52c873155ad4d6cd63723507b223a55d872
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF file contains a significant number of embedded URLs, many of which are identified as malicious redirectors or hosted on disposable domains. This strongly suggests the document is part of a link farm or SEO spam operation designed to direct users to potentially harmful content. The ML classifier also flagged this PDF with high confidence.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/123?keyword=oppressive+government+examples In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4373508/normal_5f8a1768c7985.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pupiwikupexi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134348736/2977486.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vafumavuforowa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134489815/nodiwavolanovi-vuziwegi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://satobolusiv.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398412/1f3c599.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kelobutino.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969458/704b47e98.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://genifefesabido.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/3/9/133999330/wafekogitogu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gefelamanak.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134353999/7611586.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zunifoxorim.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134320692/5a7df8dc9d67cf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bugadubotureje.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134468403/ee31aa6ce3537aa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/4721778e-41a5-4021-aa14-b6d37f7ea987/ravexolufeve.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/1254fcc2-d20c-4e2a-8651-23645cf64867/club_penguin_mission_3_hints.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/3c816e89-3000-4dc3-a420-9565b444e27e/fesojawirurel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/8c4a87a5-fec7-4935-802a-4b8d4ec3d8a0/mc5_mod_apk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e805.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE805 5292 bytes
SHA-256: 47d5a22b077c8ed04e5ff15987ad957653f0781a5aabfd227d2f749755eeceb2
font_01_sfnt_off0000f9f4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF9F4 11700 bytes
SHA-256: 25e1a030e9869148ff4458b59b743ef9ad184386aee1fb642e236aa9dc5147c8

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