Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bb15ea71c35390bd…

MALICIOUS

PDF

39.1 KB Created: 2020-10-27 05:24:30 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-10
MD5: c3e64c6f6c881cdee5efef2a0b53e350 SHA-1: 48bf179a31c83411f9804ca87d1a641e58366559 SHA-256: bb15ea71c35390bd502889b8c4b8276c28d56df46ecd9cda58d9328b6a397b2c
184 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/strik?keyword=spectrum+optical+hours In PDF document text
    • https://sokuvotaboraj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776263/zevatoxa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mulodunewumil.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134314444/nibemokenoxex.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://soremezu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070226/5947906.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xogexemufak.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437987/javakagepomo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vewutaniwem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873717/9243879.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fanawilixu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131408209/6d9bfcae3eb5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fakimodixoto.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739088/zolisevegumadop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://faworufobideped.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132682851/f1973d7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4392462/normal_5f926a0ab97a4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4383452/normal_5f8ed5e4c3422.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/pafiganovavi/belurufavapivigirubenur.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/welanisowari/1186235349.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tadovu/66932806656.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/falevi/10661378008.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/a36d191a-cced-4e70-aa97-6b6a97f180fd/minecraft_troll_maps_1.12.2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/82bfee57-92db-43d9-bc00-9458d899f7eb/69465869743.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/14b54af1-d6ea-403b-af43-fe974ef2f2f7/waziga.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/866b45a8-8d23-4ccc-84e1-8f9af4c4084a/93468473816.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/26762e95-1420-4162-a18f-2837942f377e/30933291394.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c92e30f6-6b35-40b4-b5dc-bbf1c6f16b6a/18664511838.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005a10.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5A10 5276 bytes
SHA-256: fc0bdb16bb3a6ab59709e46763d48a003e11914ec894802280699798adb0ce1f
font_01_sfnt_off00006bd7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6BD7 10580 bytes
SHA-256: 6e8d6706162b54154871785ab9bf09941cf21cee8bac1e3fe16db19e7259cf21

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