Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bb1295e19388fa2e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

160.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-07-05
MD5: 76f706a47789a65736cfe222837c4852 SHA-1: dfd9a01a3c0db23ade87672a419bf1bf555dde35 SHA-256: bb1295e19388fa2eaa5abe33ae695253939b60a237ba2a8484b112334e15fa81
114 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-0199 indicates that the OLE object is attempting to load a remote document from the URL http://103.6.248.9/z/zsxzsxzdcxdcxdvxdvxdvcxcdcxdxzfvczfvc%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23zfvcxfvzfcfzdczdxzsxzs.DOC. The presence of embedded PDF objects with suspicious static findings further supports a malicious intent, likely to deliver a secondary payload. No VBA macros were found to be executable, but the primary exploit vector is clear.

Heuristics 6

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://103.6.248.9/z/zsxzsxzdcxdcxdvxdvxdvcxcdcxdxzfvczfvc%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23zfvcxfvzfcfzdczdxzsxzs.DOC

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00000e00.pdf
2122c66a271c2c2555083d47ff6548fe037a68eee432d5a6a2dc742ede545dbe		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE00 160768 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00005e00.pdf
866b39f891f1d0f1c217f697e27356e7fa20967a3887ff27d13fffe401892aac		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x5E00 140288 bytes

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