Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bb0097d6085fb4c5…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

339.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-08-02
MD5: 243e3c34475bdf70ca47222010cc0221 SHA-1: 9ba4b3e4b9a9e6b5e17e3f1608c2158cda84ebbd SHA-256: bb0097d6085fb4c55679d016263b70cfa2727a9d505eb7fa4184ddca7f9188b9
132 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-0199 indicates that the OLE object is designed to load a remote resource. The embedded URL points to a DOC file, suggesting a document-based exploit. The presence of a polyglot PDF further indicates a multi-stage attack, likely to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://23.95.60.83/fdd/gdf04000000000000000000%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%2355400000000000000%23400040004r000000.DOC

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
stream_003_off00007560.bin
2998a126f4fa11ceb265371a5f7968ec18bc4692a32631a544232dc74040021f		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x7560 252488 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00000e00.pdf
c7eccb67ef6480989765945a383792647d0b8bf781a6bf3f2930bb1dbf6fce8d		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE00 344064 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00007a00.pdf
408b8dd23849d31fa73477e0ef3d62353cb39077625b2d2348909c5ef019f3f2		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x7A00 316416 bytes

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