Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bafac77cf10e8a56…

MALICIOUS

PDF

68.0 KB Created: 2021-06-07 09:47:54 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-29
MD5: 82b6e87114a0fa1b11dd015fd05864a6 SHA-1: e449a1a2ed457e7365a9fdc28c7395f27a458b84 SHA-256: bafac77cf10e8a56ac22c5ddfb15dd9e528b6c4b9734526333a99c7fb5c70b57
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains heuristics indicating it is a link farm and a lure for invoices or callback phishing. Multiple URLs point to compromised CMS upload storage, suggesting a distribution mechanism for malicious content. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely to download a second-stage payload or redirect to a phishing site.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://nomylo.ru/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+terminate+phone+line PDF link annotation
    • https://www.medicalart.com.tr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16088a7f9a4eab---79024281490.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.barankayalar.com.tr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a6b45d40a98---50952450558.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://penoplex24.ru/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b06674c502e---duvusavijefogadugakemulu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mavismanagement.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160962f004294a---wubatunenixigujegiperap.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.hkqi.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607f8eb72dc69---6865453657.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://angelsforwarriors.org/userfiles/files/vujoxad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://perfectthesale.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160717baac5826---tinalasusifunuluta.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://actioncoach.com.my/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a42025e4f93---66794874765.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.kadinlarsitesi.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ba13328b4cd---lijavufefofoguwi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.simplythebestevents.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b4a2e2d670b---22117563324.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://104.156.58.56/~web2inbox/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609467ef0e592---vubozexokixiwafile.pdfPDF link annotation
    • http://aivieksteslaivas.lv/userfiles/file/zakedexiwosadunadiruboloj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jockmurray.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160949ae87ff2b---41379556288.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.hagensmarketing.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a9449c1f9cf---bedexisax.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://autotrilogy.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7ab7795998afd3ad72ca40d3a5f2ea54/29167406633.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pkynfe.net/userfiles/file/welamukuxavavonojukuped.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000cdc0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCDC0 4932 bytes
SHA-256: 9398a0a676f80720f6ef2c6e93012523d556339cf1f2ddfce5121c82204fbd2f
font_01_sfnt_off0000de65.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDE65 10972 bytes
SHA-256: e762d9d314cdd3198fde8a2d270bfd39a89a2782078fb2076c7deb1616a85284