Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bae4e29ff1ba9af7…

MALICIOUS

PDF

114.2 KB Created: 2021-06-27 04:58:13 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 7debdb14a041ee68299aa8eaf3f11d9b SHA-1: b2c12f06a0337614bbe8f935b7bb2fc94938def4 SHA-256: bae4e29ff1ba9af7469dd790ed3849602ce5c717498add0dfd71e1e105e72cb8
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains numerous links pointing to compromised WordPress sites, with a high-confidence heuristic identifying a link to a PDF hosted on algorithmically-generated URL. This suggests a phishing or malware distribution attempt, likely using a spearphishing attachment as the initial access vector. No scripts were extracted, but the structure and URL patterns are indicative of malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9973

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://mandalaconfeccao.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16078f0b307023---86560901012.pdf
    • http://adanateknikservis.web.tr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16078c6dfa871e---wubuno.pdf
    • http://mirembeestate.co.ug/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607ff21f4cf15---vojonusafanululotezipu.pdf
    • https://www.cdscabling.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606d690046b70---98984445088.pdf
    • http://bjoybrands.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b2aa9598606---jagapukidopepiwekubomujiv.pdf
    • https://space1500.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7ac0d958486a14dbea9c7e56b4d1d370/42587876439.pdf
    • https://nic-irq.com/userfiles/files/jakigozimale.pdf
    • http://ontheedgeofnow.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160953b3e0fe51---kuwesabawofeto.pdf
    • http://timeyear-v.com/userfiles/file/21149709065.pdf
    • https://www.truesdalepainting.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608d6ef5978fe---xajeranonikuw.pdf
    • http://www.sunarnuricomuisvealisverismerkezi.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/k0thd1m67u19rvr18s4790aup6/joxedasoxuriramabakilafo.pdf
    • https://neavocats.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/1d9001b1e40baf8bc8549342d9b45d92/197261597.pdf
    • https://willmarlakesarea2040.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/jiwegokuwe.pdf
    • http://ajivikafinance.com/userfiles/file/pibagonumowareru.pdf
    • https://elpmarketing.ca/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/186f1a3edb591ee511ee8a933e8dbafd/23563720665.pdf
    • http://www.leesii.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a4ab2dc58c7---xuruxuzale.pdf
    • http://groupkaishan.com/d/files/59437135816.pdf
    • https://cedarcreeksauce.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/bca299066d4dbfb7333bd1708b049e60/26351823818.pdf
    • http://hill-macktribe.com/clients/7/78/785e88641dcef8d5cadf71fa969cae92/File/risopan.pdf
    • http://asalsold.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b4798641c20---gezusebemaf.pdf
    • http://www.lifestaralberta.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b3867266d12---tirogatafasezowumominumud.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/fzgW7-mxBc0/uplcv?utm_term=crossing+the+border
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000157cb.bin
7a3b6ece2d2e8092ee7fdb7231ab36b8eaed225db89ed81b92079f0dec9ba81f
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x157CB 20044 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00018aa4.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x18AA4 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0001a2bb.bin
e4fee6272dc77d4ce771e0e52e50cce1e634a31fc9993e93b8d7d8f2651b5a68
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1A2BB 10492 bytes