Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bade2b5820918077…

MALICIOUS

PDF

76.5 KB Created: 2021-05-16 11:37:22 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-27
MD5: 9e535a4600a62c1f48b56b5e473cb986 SHA-1: 5f6de4c2eac9dd18b2be8bf52b544068cf414273 SHA-256: bade2b582091807768e3fbbe0d83406944caec7c944977d54144831f82f45998
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains a large number of external links, many pointing to disposable hosting, suggesting a link farm designed to distribute malicious content or conduct phishing. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains a lure related to programming a Comcast remote, which is likely a pretext to drive traffic to these malicious URLs. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gimoguvi.ru/strik?utm_term=how+to+program+comcast+remote+to+motorola+cable+box PDF link annotation
    • http://fakexexu.sportsontheweb.net/66627373261.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/wuwexosul/hiGhgjh/kikobubanuvojonurodozu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4417220/normal_5fd9dc150daf1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vobevufubito/jjchjiL/carelink_home_health_inc.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4390097/normal_5fffe15590919.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/varugefezum/Agd9tgf/sprawl_ii_soulwax_remix.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zonizubiro.getenjoyment.net/fufanelebutubazex.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/letaziseb/ihS86ja/loragoronewod.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/774a4519-c914-4b77-ae9b-ed07d6f840f5/taco_bell_power_bowl_nutrition_information.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/putelekireza/bujopogefoxona.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6077c06c-55d8-43d7-a68d-0f6594f94301/76621466427.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://f421159b-d329-41e8-bc42-072bc93e4c50.filesusr.com/ugd/65d6f7_2e67b7387a334f6697b2b8c9ecedf415.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://9d349da1-218b-4b59-9e37-2a90cab56d40.filesusr.com/ugd/de9003_960ae71559764b0d98bf81236a749bc1.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://f3dbd103-cf2f-44fc-b0ad-c9004dc38af2.filesusr.com/ugd/1f2646_f1199aa6331d4f8bac856e79aa755b4c.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/lusegokaves/bo_staff_forms.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e198.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE198 5148 bytes
SHA-256: e6cc6a111d31c99260323bbf68df2afc4b45792a7395b5356ee1db5f48778f97
font_01_sfnt_off0000f32f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF32F 10256 bytes
SHA-256: cfbeb66b43311f91250404bfd3cc9aa02e629970cdc28043786a65d81eb6cbe3
font_02_sfnt_off0001161d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1161D 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 05d2457133b820fa77aa358e30e9acfbad3f04c46ced9a37296d9311117db176