Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bad1c2eb693a6a39…

MALICIOUS

PDF

86.5 KB Created: 2021-09-20 03:26:28 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-27
MD5: 462def1033b7b3ccda7ed3224a79747d SHA-1: f8033598b253dda5b6ea1e86fb3cd94a2117fe28 SHA-256: bad1c2eb693a6a39e5b4af00da728f82e28cbc763f613b078288a061ef3378bc
192 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript and multiple external URIs, many of which point to compromised CMS upload storage or are part of a link farm. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely to deliver a phishing or trojan payload. The presence of embedded JavaScript suggests an attempt to exploit vulnerabilities or execute malicious code upon opening.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9980

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.portofmiamitunnel.com/system/js/back/ckfinder/userfiles/files/kinabe.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://veterina-hrib.cz/user-uploads/files/17447821896.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hflbdq.com/uploads/file/18000354659.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.assofmt.org/ckfinder/userfiles/files/bemiforokemukore.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://df-foundry.net/d/files/pasiveziranakoxiresevomu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zamgph.com/FCKeditor/editor/filemanager/connectors/php/uploads/file/130609187967.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lepetitjaunais.com/userfiles/file/91944486292.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://spokoino.ru/i/upload/files/xasapiworazuzovi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hastensandbreakfast.nl/userfiles/file/doronefav.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://youzedu.com/ckimages/files/20210907103738232247.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xhiehchin.com/Xhieh_News/_file/67650924406.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://npcbalkan.net/ckeditor/ckfinder/userfiles/files/tubogezapos.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://clinicaabrahaoosta.com.br/ckfinder/userfiles/files/99511868116.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://hoongnau.com/upload/files/65111903568.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.naabelectric.com/userfiles/files/12958624574.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://travelsafeway.com/userfiles/file/61567022385.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://churchosonline.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d5744bae1fc6e93e72547e3d94fffa53/22902048625.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://namphuctourist.com/userfiles/file/33268595469.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://braintreeclinics.com/app/webroot/img/files/1010818979.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bascobrunswick.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161376c870d11f---47086632353.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://inchirieriavioane.ro/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16145d3b62101e---nasuzawamoxig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://smithmurdock.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161347306dc33b---xemaponitubinoxanib.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/fzgW7-mxBc0/uplcv?utm_term=what+are+the+risks+of+rooting+your+phonePDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ee0c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEE0C 17280 bytes
SHA-256: 717855a38aca4689e34f40289906c5d8afba724c1ba78323cdb387d6a12b9b6d
font_01_sfnt_off00011ad7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11AD7 10892 bytes
SHA-256: d533cc0242ea3ca2c62a9359a0aa96217c6c9235cecf2661c17bb98338e8a2a6
font_02_sfnt_off00013413.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13413 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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