Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bac76a30750063b6…

MALICIOUS

RTF

96.1 KB First seen: 2019-05-31
MD5: e23fefcda03d1444de1340e37503c440 SHA-1: eb2151a21c309ecd2146f4eb19a735e43f25d5d2 SHA-256: bac76a30750063b650e0ea37036d5bdb5bbf14c20bacf8d3b5cda5ece9f6e2c1
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains evidence of an Equation Editor exploit, indicated by the RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics. This exploit likely leverages OLE object data (RTF_OBJDATA) to achieve code execution. The primary goal appears to be the download and execution of a secondary payload, a common tactic for initial compromise.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000017f9.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x17F9 29728 bytes
SHA-256: f8e4bc898bf3fc63badcf3faa4e52e030e42f92916bd9019000d149d00d0247b

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